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HARD CASES OF THIRD READINGS IN TERMS OF THE STANDARD SOLUTION

Introduction. Since (Kaplan, 1969) it has been assumed that the truth conditions (TCs) of a *de re* attitude report require there to be a concrete individual concept (IC) to which the attitude holder should assign a certain property. The bearers of such an individual concept could vary across the attitude holder's alternatives but the concept itself had to remain fixed. We bring new evidence from *de re* attitude reports about *disjunctive beliefs* that challenges this view and suggests that the TCs of a *de re* attitude report must allow for ICs to vary across attitude alternatives. We account for such reports in terms of a revised version of the theory of concept generators (CGs) proposed in (Percus & Sauerland, 2003) (P&S).

Novel Data. Consider the scenario in (1):

(1) Mary, the chair of the Linguistics Department of Santa Claus University, wants to hire a star. She wants to hire the best semanticist or the best syntactician. She is not specific and will be happy with either. Unbeknownst to her, John has recently received the best syntactician award as well as the best semanticist award.

Native speakers of English report that, in this scenario, we can say (2) to John:

(2) Mary wants to hire you!

The attitude report in (2) must be a *de re* report because the individual John is not part of the content of Mary's desire. She wants to hire John only from the speaker's point of view because it is in the actual world that the best semanticist and the best syntactician happen to be one person, namely John. Mary, of course, can believe otherwise. Her desire-alternatives can contain worlds in which one person is the best syntactician and another is the best semanticist. And only one of them is hired in such worlds.

Predictions of P&S. To capture the TCs of a *de re* attitude report and avoid the so-called *double-vision* problems (Quine, 1956), P&S introduce acquaintance-based CGs. The classical example of a *de re* report in (3)a gets the LF in (3)b and TCs in (3)c.

(3) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

b. $[_S\ \lambda w$ Ralph $[_{VP}$ believes in w $[_{CP}\ \lambda G_{<e,se>}\ [_{CP}\ \lambda w'\ [_{CP}$ that $[_S\ [[$G Ortcutt$]$ w'$]\ [_{VP}$ is a spy in w'$]]]]]]]$

c. $\|(3)b\|^g$ = [λw . ∃G: G is a CG for Ralph in w & ∀w' ∈ Dox(Ralph)(w): [G(Ortcutt)](w') is a spy in w']

In other words, P&S require that there be a CG that applies to Ortcutt and returns an Ortcutt-concept for Ralph in w. And, in each of Ralph's doxastic alternatives, the bearer of that IC in that alternative is a spy.

We observe that in the context in (1) there is no acquaintance between the attitude holder and John, whereas P&S require the CGs to be acquaintance-based. Yet, it is a well-established fact that *de re* attitude reports do not have to assume an acquaintance between the attitude holder and the *res* (Aloni, 2001; Fodor, 1970; Sosa, 1970; Yalcin, 2014). So, in what follows, we will not treat the presence of an acquaintance as a necessary component of the interpretation of a *de re* attitude report.

For (2), P&S predict the following interpretation:

(4) $\|(2)\|^g$ = [λw. ∃G_1: G_1 is a CG for Mary in w & ∀w' ∈ Desire-Alt(Mary)(w): Mary hires in w' [G_1(you$_{John}$)](w')]

According to (4), the CG that the attitude verb introduces generates a particular IC when applied to John. But what could this IC be? Given Mary's disjunctive desire, it cannot be [λw . ιx(*x* is the best semanticist in *w*)] and it cannot be [λw . ιx(*x* is the best syntactician

(5) *Frege's principle*: an expression in an intensional context can be substituted by another expression that has the same intension (sense) *salva veritate* (see Frege 1948, p. 219)

For example, (3)b should be read as (6)a and a possible LF for it is given in (6)b. The elided noun has a world variable bound by the matrix abstractor. (We follow Schwager (2011) in assuming that *like* stands for being of the same brand and color.)

(6)a. Adrian wants to buy a jacket like Malte's ~~jacket~~.
b. [λw_1 Adrian wants in w_1 [λw_2 to buy in w_2 a [jacket in w_2 like in w_2 Malte's ~~jacket in w_1~~]]

(6)a is a true report in the context in (3)a because (7) and (8) pick out the same set of worlds (assuming that w_0 is the actual world). This is so because, in every world w', being a jacket like Malte's jacket in the actual world is being a green Bench jacket in w'. Thus, following Frege's principle in (5), we can substitute (8) for (7).

(7)[λw_2 PRO to buy in w_2 a [jacket in w_2 like in w_2 Malte's ~~jacket in w_0~~]
(8)[λw_2 PRO to buy in w_2 a [green Bench jacket in w_2]

In case of (4)b, what the speaker picks up directly from the context in (4)a is that Mary wants to buy a building one floor higher than Burj Khalifa. The LF for this report is given in (9). Following the standard assumptions, we suggest that there is ellipsis in comparatives. The elided predicate comes with a world variable bound by the matrix abstractor,

(9) [λw_1 Mary wants in w_1 [λw_2 PRO to buy in w_2 a building in w_2 that is one floor higher in w_2 than Burj Khalifa ~~is high in w_1~~]]

The report in (4)b is true, because (10) and (11) are equivalent (they denote the same proposition). According to Frege's principle, substitution of (10) by (11) is valid here.

(10) [λw_2 PRO to buy in w_2 a bld. in w_2 that is one fl. higher in w_2 than B.Kh. ~~is high in w_0~~]]
(11) [λw_2 PRO to buy in w_2 a building that has 192 floors in w_2]

In every possible world, a building that is one floor higher than Burj Khalifa is in the actual world is a building that has 192 floors. Thus, if (9) is a true *de dicto* report picked up directly from (4)a, then the speaker is justified in asserting (4)b because (4)b describes the very same desire that is described by (9), even though Mary would not have used the same words to express it.

This line of argumentation demonstrates that the problematic cases discussed in the literature do not require us to abandon the Standard Solution.

Importantly, the account proposed here does not violate the Intersective Predicate Generalization that disallows intersecting predicates evaluated in different possible worlds (Keshet 2008). For example, in (9), the elided predicate *is high in w_1* is not the one that is intersected with the predicate *building in w_2*. The former predicate is just a subconstituent of a bigger predicate *is one floor higher in w_2 than Burj Khalifa in w_1* that is intersected with *building in w_2*.

Further predictions. In our talk, we will go over other problematic cases proposed in Schwager (2011) and Sudo (2014): *Adrian is planning to order a piano like your grandmother's*, *The reporter wants to interview someone who broke the curfew*, *Mary thinks that Sue is Catholic*. We will show that they can all be naturally derived in terms of the Standard Solution along the lines proposed here.