Mr. Frege, The Platonist

Daniel Sierra

Аннотация


Although Frege is one of the prominent figureheads of analytic philosophy, it is not surprising that there are still issuessurrounding his views, interpreting them, and labeling them. Frege’s view on numbers is typically termed as Platonistic orat least a type of Platonism (Reck 2005). Still, the term ‘Platonism’ has views and assumptions ascribed to it that may bemisleading and leads to mischaracterizations of Frege’s outlook on numbers and ideas. So, clarification of the term‘Platonism’ is required to portray Frege’s views more accurately (Reck 2005). This clarification gives us a better picture of what Frege is interested in and what he does not emphasize. Moreover, in such a clarifying process, we find that Frege draws heavy influence from Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who is frequently called a Neo-Kantian (Vagnetti 2018). InLotze’s major work, Logik, Lotze has a central focus on validity, in its most general form as he used it, that investigatesvarious related topics, i.e., concepts, language, etc. (Vagnetti 2018; Lotze 1888). Furthermore, we observe that Frege’s work is so similar to Lotze, that it seems questionable to call his outlook ‘Platonism’. Therefore, attributing ‘Platonism’ to Frege may be a slight misnomer. This paper’s entirety is mostly a synthesis of a variety of articles related to Frege, Lotze, and their respective outlooks and the original works of Frege and Lotze that I use to support the view that the term ‘Platonism’ is a slight issue when predicated to Frege. As such, I include an overview of Frege’s treatment incontemporary literature that highlights the usage of the term ‘Platonism’ and how broad its uses tend to be utilized (Balaguer 2006; Burge 1992). In sum, it is observed that the general label ‘Platonism’ becomes less appropriate when we consider Lotze in the picture and contrast Lotze alongside Mr. Frege. Overall, this paper is just an explanatory one of Mr. Frege, the Platonist, and the issues of applying the term ‘Platonism’ onto him as his views are seemingly more of a segue from Lotze.


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Литература


Balaguer 2006 — Balaguer M. Realism and Anti-Realism in Mathematics // Philosophy of mathematics / ed. by A. D. Irwine. North Holland, 2006. P. 35–101.

Burge 1992 — Burge T. Frege on Knowing the Third Realm // Mind. 1992. Vol. 111, no. 404. P. 633–650.

Frege 1990 — Frege G. On Sense And Reference // Meaning and Reference / ed. by A. W. Moore. OUP, 1990.

Frege 2001 — Frege G. Thought // Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology / ed. by A. P. Martinich and E. D. Sosa. Blackwell, 2001. P. 19–31.

Frege 1960 — Frege G. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry. Into the Concept of Number. New York: Harper & Row, 1960.

Lotze 1884 — Lotze H. Logic, in Three Books, of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge. Clarendon Press, 1884.

Vagnetti 2018 — Vagnetti M. The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze: The Concept of Geltung // Philosophical Readings. 2018. Vol. 10, no. 2.

Reck 2005 — Reck E. H. Frege on Numbers: Beyond the Platonist Picture // Harvard Review of Philosophy. 2005. Vol. 13, no. 2. P. 25–40.




DOI: https://doi.org/10.52119/LPHS.2021.72.65.013

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(c) 2021 Daniel Sierra

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